of value, sociobiological theories of value, materialist theories of value, or culture-based theories of value. Economic anthropologists (Durrenberger 1984:12) and human behavioral ecologists (Cashdan 1990:15) have called for such operationalizations of basic concepts in economic theory. My application among Andean herders indicates that material factors that influence men's and women's prestige and ability to care for offspring seem to influence the values individuals assign to animals.
GENERAL UTILITY THEORY
General utility theory is a perspective on how people assign value based on their ordering of preferences (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; Luce and Raiffa 1957; Raiffa 1968; Myerson 1979) . Utility is a measure of the satisfaction a person derives from choosing a good, a course of action, or a lottery that offers chances of attaining a good.
1 Utility theory methods take advantage of individuals' subjective risk perception to derive values for objects or decisions. The application of utility theory methods does not require that a decision maker have any explicit idea of probability or make mathematical calculations (Rapoport 1966:30; Raiffa 1968:274) . More importantly, application of this approach does not require that a decision maker be concerned with maximizing any "objectively" measured currency such as energy, money, or labor; this independence from assumptions of what constitutes value gives utility theory methodology its potential for evaluating theories of value. Utility theory allows measurement of peoples' subjective values of goods, or even of subjective states such as rank, self-fulfillment, and so on. The decision maker need only make decisions based on his or her subjective perception of probabilities that certain events may occur.
Several assumptions underlie utility theory methodology, namely that a decision maker's preferences (over goods, alternative jobs, alternative courses of action) are complete, transitive, and continuous (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Luce and Raiffa 1957; Myerson 1979 ).
1. Completeness means that a decision maker can compare any alternatives under consideration. 2. Transitivity means that if a decision maker prefers an alternative-A to B, and B to C-then the decision maker will also prefer A to C. 3. Continuity means that a decision maker's utility increases in a continuous manner, such that if A is preferred to C, any option, B, which is ranked between A and C, can be represented by a randomized combination between A and C. A lottery is a randomized combination yielding probabilities of win-ning the goods A and C, and so the use of lotteries to elicit values is consistent with the continuity assumption.
Provided a decision maker's preferences meet these requirements, researchers can use utility theory methods to monitor preferences and to model decision making. Alternative methods of monitoring risk-averse behavior and decision processes have been proposed in anthropology, including methods based on risky decisions and linguistic analysis of decision sequences (Gladwin 1975 (Gladwin , 1989 Quinn 1978; Ortiz 1980 Ortiz , 1983 Werner and Schoepfle 1987) . All of these methods, and the one I am proposing, deserve more attention to delimit their relative strengths and limitations.
One methodology that has gained much notoriety in environmental economics is contingent valuation. Contingent valuation involves asking respondents how much they would pay for some nonmarket good, such as preserving a habitat or renovating a public landmark (Carson 2000) . This method became controversial because environmentalists and government agencies began using the technique to levy fines against industries that pollute as in the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Portney 1994) . Conservative business interests enlisted their own economists to argue against the method.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) appointed a special task force led by two Nobel laureates in economics (Kenneth Arrow and Robert Solow) to evaluate the scientific validity of contingent valuation. Their landmark report pointed out that contingent valuation could provide realistic estimates of value for nonmarket goods, but only if the methodology adhered to a number of strict guidelines. These guidelines include face-to-face interviewing, using referendum or closed-ended questions, and using follow-up questions to ensure that respondents understand the interview task, to name a few (Arrow et al. 1993:4611-13) . The NOAA panel findings did little to appease conflicting economists, and the debate continues (for pro opinions, see Portney 1994; Carson 1997 Carson , 2000 Whittington 1998; for con, see McFadden 1994; Hanley and Milne 1996; Gatto and De Leon 2000) .
While contingent valuation may yield valid utilities under appropriate circumstances, and while it has also been applied in non-Western contexts in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean (Whittington et al. 1990; Whittington, Lauria, and Mu 1991; Choe, Whittington, and Lauria 1996; Echessah et al. 1997; Whittington 1998) , the method is further limited in ways that basic utility theory methodology is not. A typical application of contingent valuation involves asking about the worth of nonmarket goods in terms of monetary currencies such as dollars. In Western, industrialized settings where people truly use currency as a medium of exchange, it is probably reasonable for people to estimate value in terms of currency. However, where currency is not much used or not used at all, monetary currency is not appropriate. For instance, when I made purchases among Aymara herders in Peru, they insisted that payment be made in food (flour, sugar, rice) or utilitarian goods (sleeping bags). Monetary currency was little valued because Peruvian currency devalues at an alarming rate, and markets where it could be used were distant. One could conceivably use an indigenous currency (e.g., llama-units in the Andes, or polished stone axe-units in New Guinea), but given the indivisible nature of such valuables, estimating the precise value of a good would be difficult if not impossible (a respondent is not likely to accept a half a llama or stone axe). Utility theory methodology provides interval-scale measurements of value without asking respondents to accept nonsensical payments or currencies they do not value. For these reasons, the method I propose in this article probably has broader applicability.
EXAMPLE 1-CHECKING THE ASSUMPTIONS
The first step in applying utility theory methods among Aymara pastoralists was to establish whether a utility theory approach was warranted. First, I asked herders, "Do you like some types of animals better than others?" Then I had the herders order their preferences by asking, "Which animal do you like best? Which animal do you like the least?" In addition, I had herders explain the relative merits and problems of each herd species to gain a more thorough understanding of why they had their preferences. The Aymara herders I interviewed in southern Peru had no trouble rank ordering their preferences among different herd animals, satisfying the completeness axiom.
The second step was to test whether a herder's preferences were transitive. Testing transitivity was easy in my application because only three species of animals were herded in each of the communities where I worked. For example, if a person stated that alpacas were most valued and sheep least valued in step 1, then llamas had to be of intermediate value. I tested this by then asking, "Is a llama better than a sheep?" "Is an alpaca better than a llama?" "Is an alpaca better than a sheep?" If they replied "yes" to these questions, they demonstrated transitivity. All herders replied consistently with their initially stated preferences, so their preferences were transitive. This method resembles paired comparisons and triad tests, in which researchers count incidences where items are paired or ask respondents to rank the similarity of items (Weller 1998:390) . These counts not only test for transitivity, but also provide similarity values among items based on ranking scales established by the researcher (Weller 1998:392) . However, utility theory methodology does not depend on a researcher's a priori assignation of a ranking scale since a respondent's own perceptions of probabilities are used to establish value.
To ascertain whether the continuity axiom seemed reasonable, I asked the herders whether they understood the difference between having prizes of animals for certain versus lotteries that offered chances of winning animals. I did this by asking them directly whether they understood the questions. I also inquired whether they had played lotteries, which most Peruvian cities run. All the herders affirmed their understanding of lotteries, and many had actually played them. The important point here is that respondents have an idea of subjective probability, of the comparative likelihood of different events. Since utility theory methodology is based on peoples' subjective probabilities, no precise understanding of probability is required.
EXAMPLE 2-MEASURING VALUE
Once I ascertained that utility theory assumptions were reasonable, I could apply utility theory methods for measuring the value of animals. This involves presenting people with different options, or lotteries, that have different long-run expected utilities. Expected utility is important because a probabilistic return (e.g., a 50% chance of winning $100) either awards an individual, or not, depending on whether an event (winning) occurs. However, if one were to repeat the trial many times, the expected value would equal the prize, multiplied by the probability of winning (expected utility = 0.5 × $100 = $50). It is a person's subjective evaluation of the probability of winning a preferred item, and therefore that person's subjective evaluation of expected value, that enables a researcher to measure that person's subjective value of the item. The general formula that measures utility values for items is the following: Value of intermediately preferred good = (Value of most preferred good) × (Probability of winning most preferred good in a lottery) + (Value of the least preferred good) × (Probability of winning least-preferred good in a lottery). The probabilities must add up to one.
To obtain initial measures of the relative values of herd animals, I first assigned the most highly regarded animal a value of one, and the least-regarded animal a value of zero. Since I set the most-and least-preferred goods values of one and zero respectively, the formula can be simplified to the following: Value of intermediately preferred good = 1 × (Probability of winning most-preferred good in a lottery).
I measured the relative values of the other species between one and zero by presenting a herder with a choice between a species of intermediate preference for certain, or a lottery offering probabilistic chances of winning the most-and least-preferred species. For example, if a herder most preferred a llama and least preferred a sheep, I asked the herder, "Which would you choose? A llama for certain, or a lottery ticket with 50% probability of winning an alpaca?"
If the herder preferred the certain prize, the llama, then I would ask the question again, increasing the probability of winning the most-preferred animal until the herder had a difficult time deciding which was the better choice-the certain prize, or the lottery offering a chance of winning the most-preferred animal. When a respondent changed his or her mind about a lottery, or replied, "I am not sure," indifference was implied.
Continuing the example, if a herder was indifferent between having a llama for sure or a lottery with a 70% chance of winning an alpaca (the most preferred) and a 30% chance of winning a sheep (the least preferred), then this indicated that the relative value for a llama is 0.70 = 0.70 (1, the value of an alpaca) + 0.30 (0, the value of a sheep). The person's preference ordering can thus be transformed to an interval scale where the relative values of alpaca, llama, and sheep are 1, 0.70, and 0 respectively. These are arbitrary values, especially the assignation of zero to the least preferred animal that, in fact, has some value to a respondent. This arbitrariness is not a problem for modeling because the values can be changed with any linear transformation (e.g., multiplying and adding constants) and still preserve their ordering (Rapoport 1966:28; Myerson 1979 ).
DIFFICULTIES
Several difficulties may arise with this method. One concerns the probability perception of consultants. In some attempts to incorporate uncertainty in economic anthropology, the probabilities people use to make decisions are assumed to be accurately and objectively perceived quantities of the environment (Stephens 1990 ). Calavan (1984:58, 66 ) more realistically treats decision-maker probabilities as given quantities (accurate or not) based on a person's evaluation of various sources of information. Similarly, utility theory does not require decision makers to make any specific probability estimates or mathematical calculations, respondents simply must offer their subjective reactions to differing levels of probability. In my experience, most Aymara herders are very familiar with evaluating subjective probabilities and readily make decisions and compare their desires with the probabilities of attaining those desires (Kuznar 1991a (Kuznar , 1991b (Kuznar , 1991c (Kuznar , 1994 . Since everyone must survive in an uncertain world, I suspect people in many non-Western economies will reasonably be able to respond to questions concerning probabilities (Calavan 1984:55) . Once again, a respondent need not (and in fact should not) have a mathematically precise understanding of probability to respond in a manner consistent with his or her subjective feelings about choices.
Another problem is subtler, yet very important. A tacit assumption underlying utility theory methodology is that the data researchers receive reflect peoples' goals and aspirations. The necessity of separating goals (that may be entirely culturally defined) from constraints (that may be physical, social, or ideological) is central in models of decision making. Separating goals and constraints may be difficult to achieve in the field since, when a person is presented with alternative animals, the person may state his or her preferences not according to his or her aspirations but with consideration of the resources that the person has available to support the animals in question. This problem has been recognized and discussed by Cancian (1980 Cancian ( :165, 1989 and Ortiz (1983:276) .
EXAMPLE 3-SEPARATING GOALS AND ASPIRATIONS
A few herders demonstrated the problem of separating goals and aspirations with respect to their preferences for cows. Cows demand a large amount of high-quality forage, and their stocking rates (amount of land required for one animal) are at least nine times higher than those for goats in the region where I worked (Kuznar 1991c (Kuznar :98, 1991d . Some families do not have access to enough high-quality pasture and alfalfa to support a cow; the option of having a cow is not feasible for them, although most would very much like to own one. Therefore, some herders assigned a low value to cows, reflecting their preevaluation that they could not raise a cow, not their desire to own a cow.
I had to be careful that people were giving me their actual preferences and not the result of their own optimizing calculations. Untrained researchers unfamiliar with a respondent's language and culture cannot apply utility theory methods in a formulaic fashion. It is crucial that a dialogue takes place to ensure that all parties (anthropologists, translators, and people being consulted) understand the meaning of the questions asked. This dialogue goes beyond a momentary rapport. There is no substitute for an ethnographer's familiarity with his or her consultants and, perhaps more important, with the culture in which he or she works. Only through such familiarity can ethnographers understand what questions have appropriate relevance in a particular cultural setting (see Werner and Schoepfle 1987 on questionnaires) .
EXAMPLE 4-AN APPLICATION
Using these methods, I examined risk aversion in two Andean herding communities located in contrasting environmental settings; one located in the high sierra (2,500 m-3,800 m above sea level), and one in the Andean puna (above 3,800 m). The high sierra has deep valleys, abrupt terrain, seasonal rains, and highly unpredictable precipitation (Kuznar 1991c) . Aymara pastoralists follow forage up and down the sierra valleys seasonally with their herds of goats, sheep, and cattle. Aymara herders in the puna keep indigenous herd animals, the llama (Lama glama) and the alpaca (Lama pacos). The puna has extremely cold temperatures, rolling terrain, and pastures restricted to marshes (Kuznar in press). Puna settlement is restricted to these marshes.
Two trained Aymara assistants and I interviewed twelve herders among the high sierra families (50% of adults in the community) and eleven herders in the puna community (17.5% of adults). We conducted interviews in the language with which a respondent was most comfortable to evaluate the relative values of the potential herd animals in each major environmental zone (goats, sheep, and cows in the high sierra; llamas, alpacas, and sheep in the puna). All male and most female respondents were fluent in Spanish, and one woman was monolingual in Aymara.
High sierra pastoralists demonstrated a wide range of preferences for specific animals. In general, they preferred cows to goats, and sheep had the lowest preference. Some individuals preferred goats (average utility value .51, maximum value 1) above other animals, others preferred sheep (average utility value .27), and yet others preferred cows (average utility value .69, see Table 1 ).
There were interesting gender differences in animal preference. Women had a tendency to value animals with a direct domestic household use, preferring sheep because they provide useful wool and cows because they provide milk. When men preferred cows, it was because of the cow's high potential market value, or high prestige value. This is only a tendency, and women also noted the high market values of these animals. Other researchers (e.g., McCorkle 1990:16) have shown gender to be a crucial variable in determining the goals of Andean agro-pastoralists. Clearly, there is a dichotomy of values in which high sierra women value animals that produce goods useful for immediate household consumption, whereas men tend to prefer animals that provide benefits in the public prestige and market sector. Men and women are not unaware of the values of these animals for the opposite sex, but they have their own gendered reasons for preferring certain animals.
Puna pastoralists almost universally preferred alpacas to llamas, with the average utility value for alpacas being .98 (maximum value 1), compared to an average utility value for llamas of .59. Puna pastoralists universally devalued sheep based on these animals' inability to survive snow and predation hazards. No significant gender differences in preference appeared to exist among puna herders.
CONCLUSIONS
My applications of utility theory methods in the Andes allowed evaluation of peoples' subjective values of animals and testing of anthropological theories of risk aversion and utility maximization (Kuznar 1991a, in press, n.d.) , and these methods can be applied to any situation where completeness, transitivity, and continuity may apply. Since value presumably drives peoples' economic decisions, and value is often asserted to be subjective, this method could prove useful for anthropologists in two ways. First, the method, provided its assumptions are met, can provide measurements of subjective values. Second, by collecting measurements of subjective value and comparing them to etic phenomena (kcal yields, number of offspring, monetary values, etc.), anthropologists could potentially test competing theories of value. 
NOTE
1. If one were working among the Yanomamo, who count 1, 2, and more than 2 (Chagnon 1992) , asking about lottery games would be pointless. Researchers use a variety of means to deal with consultants' lack of formal mathematical training. In one Brazilian case, previous interviews were used to see if the peasants could describe the likelihood of yield probabilities as possibilities out of ten (Dillon and Scandizzo 1978:426) . In another study conducted in India, the researchers based their games on coin tosses (Binswanger 1980:396) . I could see the first approach being most generally useful-discussing stochastic events with which people were familiar, and then asking people to express the likelihood of their occurrence. This is no guarantee that people will understand probabilities, nor is it a guarantee that people who do understand probabilities will be able to express what they know. However, these methods should identify those who understand likelihood and have a vocabulary with which to describe their knowledge and can therefore be used to evaluate their subjective values.
